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Society depends upon its police departments to maintain or-
der, prevent and detect crime, and enforce the law. The ability 
of any police department to succeed in these tasks depends upon 
the ability of each of its individual police officers to do so. Soci-
ety therefore has an interest in monitoring the behavior of each 
of its police officers to see if he or she has any physical, mental, 
or moral flaws which make the officer incapable of carrying out 
his or her charge. However, this interest may sometimes conflict 
with the police officer's privacy interest, as well as with society's 
interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens. 
For the most part, the law's attempts to govern this conflict 
have been far from satisfying. Rules and regulations that govern 
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police officers' off-duty conduct are often broadly worded, usu-
ally prohibiting any "misconduct" or "conduct unbecoming an 
officer."1 Consequently, issues concerning regulation of the pri-
vate, off-duty, activities of police officers arise frequently, with 
the lower courts divided both in their analytic approaches and 
results. While several lower courts have upheld the removal, sus-
pension, or demotion of police officers for off-duty conduct in-
volving such things as adultery,2 transvestite behavior,3 and 
spending the night with a co-employee,4 others have not allowed 
such state intrusion into the private lives of public employees, 
often basing this decision on some constitutional right of pri-
vacy.~ Such ad hoc treatment is a source of injustice to the po-
lice officer who may find him or herself dismissed, suspended, or 
demoted, without warning, for engaging in conduct that most 
people are free to engage in without consequence.6 
This Note proposes a framework for dealing with problems in 
this area in a manner which best balances the competing inter-
ests involved. It argues that, while there is no explicit constitu-
1. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1971) (citing a 
Greensboro regulation prohibiting conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman"); 
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Livingston, 22 Ariz. App. 183, 185, 525 P.2d 949, 950 (1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 951 (1975) (citing Tucson Police Department Regulation § 6-8.401(7) 
prohibiting "conduct unbecoming an officer"); Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 
313 n.l, 414 A.2d 82, 84 n.1 (1980) (citing art. I,§ 1.75 of the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment Duty Manual which provides for dismissal for "conduct unbecoming an officer"); 
Lubbock v. Estrello, 581 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (citing Lubbock Civil 
Service Rule XIV, § 54 providing for dismissal or suspension for the commission of acts 
showing lack of good moral character and conduct prejudicial to good order). 
For statutory prohibitions, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 46190(4) (Purdon 1966) 
(prohibiting "immorality ... or conduct unbecoming an officer"); IND. CODE § 18-1-11-3 
(1976 ed.) (prohibiting "conduct unbecoming an officer"); lowA CODE ANN. § 400.19 
(West 1976) (prohibiting "misconduct"); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:14-147 (West 1980) 
(prohibiting "misconduct"). 
2. E.g., Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Faust v. Police Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 22 Pa. Commw. 123, 347 A.2d 765 (1975). , 
3. E.g., Etscheid v. Police Bd., 47 Ill. App. 2d 124, 197 N.E.2d 484 (1964). 
4. E.g., Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 404 
(1983). 
5. See, e.g., Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 
1983) (holding that dismissal of part-time police officer, because he was cohabiting with a 
married woman not his wife, violated his right of privacy protected by the constitution); 
Swope v. Bratton, 541 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (finding that a police officer's rela-
tionship with a female employee of the police department is protected by a constitu-
tional right of privacy); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 
1979) (holding that a police department policy requiring officers, upon penalty of losing 
their jobs, to answer all questions asked in an official investigation, even though ques-
tions have no bearing upon officer's job performance, violates the officer's constitution-
ally protected right of privacy). 
6. This Note considers only the regulation of otherwise lawful off-duty activities. See 
infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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tional guarantee of privacy, the state is not free to regulate all 
aspects of a police officer's otherwise legal, off-duty, sexual activ-
ity. Part I of the Note examines several possible sources of a 
constitutional right of privacy. It concludes that, although many 
of the courts which invalidate state regulation of police officers' 
off-duty sexual activity do so on the basis of some constitutional 
right of privacy, any implied fundamental right of sexual privacy 
should be construed narrowly to protect only those activities 
within the realm of a family relationship. Part II analyzes an 
alternative basis for protecting this type of behavior. It asserts 
that prohibiting a police officer from engaging in off-duty sexual 
conduct in which the general public may otherwise engage vio-
lates equal protection. Finally, Part III argues that even if a suf-
ficient state interest can be found to validate the separate treat-
ment of police officers and other citizens for legislative purposes, 
a broad "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard is too vague 
to survive as a sufficient prohibition against off-duty, "immoral" 
behavior. 
I. DUE PROCESS AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO SEXUAL 
PRIVACY 
Many courts have not hesitated to permit state intrusion into 
the private activities of police offiers.7 On the other hand, sev-
eral courts have invalidated state regulation of the off-duty, con-
sensual, sexual conduct of police officers on the basis of some 
constitutional right of privacy. 8 The determination of which is 
the correct view of the right of privacy establishes the proper 
level of protection to be afforded police officers from state intru-
sion into their private activities. 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of pri-
vacy. 9 However, the Supreme Court has, for over a decade, rec-
ognized a right of privacy, founded in the fourteenth amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty. 10 Consequently, the degree to 
which this judicially-recognized right of privacy is considered 
7. See, e.g., Shawgo v. Spadlin, 701 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
404 (1983) (declaring that cohabitation by, or romantic involvement between, a 
subordinate and a superior officer is within the scope of state personnel regulation and 
not protected by the Constitution); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555, 563 (M.D.N.C. 
1978) (indicating that adulterous conduct is protected by neither the constitutional right 
of association nor the analogous right of privacy). 
8. See supra note 5. 
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
10. Id. at 152-54; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977). 
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fundamental governs the extent to which the state may regulate 
the off-duty private sexual behavior of public employees. 11 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to answer defini-
tively whether, and to what extent, the Constitution prohibits 
state regulation of the private sexual behavior of consenting 
adults. 12 Furthermore, the Court has, at different times, es-
poused different views as to how fundamental the right of pri-
vacy actually is. For example, the Court has stated that only 
fundamental rights are included in the guarantee of personal 
privacy.13 Yet it has also declared that the right to be free from 
governmental intrusion into one's privacy, except in very limited 
circumstances, is indeed a fundamental right. 14 Which of these 
two categories privacy actually belongs in-fundamental right or 
merely protector of fundamental rights-depends on the ulti-
mate source of the individual's right of privacy. Consequently, 
an effective determination of whether a constitutional right of 
privacy extends to the private, consensual, sexual activities of 
off-duty police officers requires examination of those constitu-
tional provisions from which such a right might arise. 
If a right of privacy does exist, it is most likely either a pe-
11. Under modern due process analysis, deprivation of a liberty which lacks textual 
support ordinarily will be found constitutional so long as the deprivation bears a rational 
relationship to the achievement of some permissible legislative objective. Lupu, Untan-
gling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1029-30 (1979); 
Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy By the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 
173, 195-96 (1980); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). However, 
regulations limiting "fundamental" rights must be justified by a "compelling" state in-
terest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); and Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)). Classification of a right as fundamental or not gener-
ally determines the outcome of a constitutional challenge to state regulation of that 
right, because rebuttal of the presumption of validity is generally not possible for regula-
tion of non-fundamental liberties. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 
1410, 1426 (1974); Lupu, supra, at 1030. 
12. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977); Briggs v. North 
Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 589 (W.D. Mich 1983). 
While several of the lower courts have recognized no constitutional protection of sex-
ual conduct outside marriage, see, e.g., Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.N.Y. 
1983); Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982); Johnson v. San Jacinto 
Junior College, 498 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980), others have reached the opposite con-
clusion, see, e.g., State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976); State v. Saunders, 75 
N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). 
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[O]nly personal rights that can be 
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit' in the concept of ordered liberty . . . are included in 
this guarantee of personal privacy."). 
14. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("[F]undamental is the right to be 
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into 
one's privacy."). 
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ripheral right, emanating from several of the specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights, or it is encompassed in the ninth amend-
ment's protection of certain rights retained by the people. As 
will shortly be shown, neither source seems particularly well-
suited to protect the off-duty sexual behavior of public employ-
ees. Hence, decisions striking down state regulation of police of-
ficers' off-duty activities on the grounds that such regulations 
impose on the officer's right of privacy are inadequate; rather an 
alternative basis should be utilized and two possibilities are ex-
amined in Parts II and III of this Note. 111 
A. Penumbral Protection of the Right of Privacy 
The "penumbras" or shadows which emanate from specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights compose the first potential 
source of the constitutional right of privacy. This ancillary the-
ory of the right of privacy was first recognized in Grisl.J.!old v. 
Connecticut, 16 in which the Supreme Court adamantly advo-
cated the sanctity of the marital bedroom,17 and implicity cate-
gorized any private, consensual, sexual relations between mar-
ried persons as within the "zone of privacy" protected against 
unwarranted government interference.18 While the result in 
Griswold may be correct, its logic remains unconvincing. 
15. An additional possible protection of police officers' off-duty sexual activities is the 
right of association arising out of the first amendment, applied to the states by the four-
teenth amendment. For example, in Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984), the 
court, stating that "the first amendment freedom of association applies not only to situa-
tions where an advancing of common beliefs occurs, but also to purely social and per-
sonal associations," id. at 1544, held that the police department violated a police officer's 
constitutionally protected freedom of association when it discharged him solely for dat-
ing the daughter of a convicted felon who was alledgedly a key figure in organized crime. 
Contrary to Wilson, however, it is arguable that the right of association provides limited 
protection, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-23, at 700-01 (1978), and pre-
serves nothing more than an individual's "right to join with others to pursue goals inde-
pendently protected by the first amendment." Id. at 702 (emphasis in original). Thus a 
police officer's purely social off-duty activities would not be protected. This view is sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 
(1974) which may be read in conjunction with Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494 (1977), as allowing local governments to assert "a general power to dictate the inti-
mate composition of domestic associations," L. TRIBE, supra § 15-18, at 977, at least 
when no traditional family relationship is involved. 
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute that made use of contraceptives a 
criminal offense, since such regulation would be an unconstitutional invasion of the right 
of privacy of married persons). 
17. Id. at 485-86. 
18. Henkin, supra note 11, at 1424 ("What is barred to 'intrusion' [in Griswold] is 
not the bedroom but ... the 'marital privacy ... .' "). 
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Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas declared that spe-
cific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have "penumbras" or 
shadows which emanate from those guarantees in order to "give 
them life and substance."19· According to Douglas, the emana-
tions from the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments create a 
right of privacy sufficient to protect the sexual activities of mar-
ried couples.-20' For a "penumbra" theory to have meaning, how-
ever, the penumbra! right must have some connection to the 
specific guarantee from which it emanates;21 otherwise, the 
courts may arbitrarily create rights never conferred by the 
Framers. 
Yet the amendments Douglas mentioned as creating an ancil-
lary right of privacy have little to do with the right of married 
people to be unregulated in their sexual relations. 22 Prior to 
Griswold, any right of privacy emanating from explicit constitu-
tional guarantees might reasonably have been found to protect 
one of two distinct interests,23 the individual's interest in seclu-
sion,2• or his interest in secrecy.25 By invalidating a statute 
prohibiting use of contraceptives, the Court in Griswold recog-
nized a completely new privacy interest: the general right to be 
free from governmental regulation26-put simply, a "right to be 
let alone."27 Yet this interest emanates from no specific constitu-
tional guarantee. 
In short, Griswold's penumbra! theory lacks a legitimate ha-
19. 381 U.S. at 484. Note that, under this view, privacy would be categorized merely 
as a protector of otherwise fundamental rights. 
20. 381 U.S. at 484-85. 
21. Posner, supra note 11, at 191. 
22. 381 U.S. at 528-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
23. Posner, supra note 11, at 174. 
24. This consists of the right to be free from official intrusion, protected, for example, 
by the third amendment's prohibition of quartering troops in private homes during 
peacetime without the owner's consent, U.S. CONST. amend. Ill, and the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, U.S. CONST. amend. IV. One com-
mentator has said that this aspect of privacy affords the individual the opportunity "to 
think, plan and reflect without frequent interruption." Posner, supra note 11, at 174. 
25. This consists of the individual's right to conceal selected aspects of his or her 
activity from the government, protected, for example, by the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination clause, U.S CONST. amend V. 
26. Henkin, supra note 11, at 1424-25. This right to be free of government regulation 
can be distinguished from the right to be free of government intrusion, supra note 24. 
Through the right to be free of government intrusion the individual claims the right to 
do unimpeded in private whatever he is otherwise legally allowed to do. Through the 
right to be free of government regulation he claims a right to do in private something he 
is otherwise prohibited from doing. See Posner, supra note 11, at 193. 
27. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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sis. 28 The decision prohibits governmental regulation of certain 
private sexual activities but provides no adequate rationale for 
how the Court reached its result to help establish the outer 
bounds of this prohibition.29 Assuming that post-Griswold a 
state may still punish at least some offenses committed in pri-
vate,30 the holding in Griswold provides limited guidance and 
should be narrowly construed to provide fundamental protection 
only of marital privacy. 31 
Consequently, the penumbra theory of privacy has little value 
as a shield to protect public employees from state intrusion into 
their private sex lives. Indeed, if it were not for Justice Doug-
las's cryptic opinion in Griswold, the penumbra theory would 
not serve as a legitimate source of any constitutional right of 
privacy, and the holding in Griswold may adequately guard only 
against state intrusion into off-duty, marital, sexual activity.32 
28. As one commentator notes, "when the Constitution sought to protect private 
rights it specified them; that it explicitly protects some elements of privacy, but not 
others, suggests that it did not mean to protect those not mentioned." Henkin, supra 
note 11, at 1422; accord Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 508-10 (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
29. In the course of his opinion, Justice Douglas never indicates which, if any, of the 
amendments he mentions is infringed by the Connecticut statute. 381 U.S. at 528 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting). 
30. 381 U.S. at 530 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I suppose ... that even after (Gris-
wold] a State can constitutionally still punish at least some offenses which are not com-
mitted in public."); accord Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 n.11 (1969). 
31. The Court's post-Griswold language seemingly indicates a retreat from the view 
of privacy as being based solely on the marital relationship. For example, in declaring a 
state prohibition of contraceptives to unmarried persons impermissible, the Court stated 
that, 
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its 
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child. 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). However, the decision in Eisenstadt was 
not based on a finding that unmarried persons have a fundamental right to use contra-
ception but rather on the irrationality of the distinction between married and unmarried 
couples for this purpose. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. Indeed, the court 
in Eisenstadt clearly recognized that "in Griswold the right of privacy in question in-
hered in the martial relationship." 405 U.S. at 453. 
32. One indication that the courts have read the decision to provide fundamental 
protection at least to marital privacy is the fact that "[t)he current trend of case law 
indicates that anti-sodomy legislation no longer is applicable to married couples, regard-
less of whether the wording of the state statute has been changed to accord with Gris-
wold." Note, Right of Privacy-Consensual Sodomy and the Choice of a Moral Doc-
trine: New York's Permissive Position, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 75, 80 (1982) (footnote 
omitted). 
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B. Natural Right Theory of Privacy 
A second possible source of the constitutional right of privacy, 
the ninth amendment, provides that "[t]he enumeration in the 
Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people."33 This language has 
led some to conclude that the Framer!;! intended to announce the 
principle that, in addition to those fundamental rights explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution, there exist other, unmentioned, 
fundamental rights that are also protected against unwarranted 
governmental interference. 34 
Acknowledgment that unmentioned natural rights are pro-
tected as fundamental, however, does not identify these natural 
rights. Even proponents of this view of the ninth amendment 
recognize that judges cannot categorize an unspecified right as 
fundamental based merely on their personal discretion. 35 Unfor-
tunately, the factors that elevate an unspecified right to funda-
mental status are not clearly articulated. It has been said, how-
ever, that courts must inquire whether the right "is of such a 
character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fun-
damental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of 
all our civil and political institutions' .... "36 With this amor-
phous view in mind, the following sections examine several pos-
sible formulations of a natural right protection of sexual 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
34. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring); ac-
cord United Mine Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947). Justice Goldberg's 
examination of the history of the ninth amendment found that "[i]t was proffered to 
quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently 
broad to cover all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would 
be interpreted as a denial that others were protected." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-89 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Hence, in Justice Goldberg's opinion, the 
ninth amendment supports the view that the liberty protected by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments includes rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. Id. at 
493. This position lends support to those who insist that "an intense and widely shared 
adherence to natural rights ideas by the Constitution's framers led them to neglect more 
specific mention of rights deemed too obvious to require elaboration." L. TRIBE, supra 
note 15, § 15-3, at 894. 
35. 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J. concurring) ("In determining which rights are fun-
damental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and pri-
vate notions."). 
36. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). The traditions and col-
lective conscience of the country may also establish a right as fundamental, id. (citing 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)), but the impracticality of applying this 
test-i.e. how can the court determine the collective conscience?-renders it nothing 
more than a goal to be approximated. 
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privacy.37 
1. Right to be free from unwarranted governmental regula-
tion of morality- The Supreme Court has long recognized that 
the police power may be exercised to preserve and protect public 
morals. 38 Some courts, however, distinguish between regulation 
of public morality and regulation of private morality.39 Implic-
itly recognizing a natural right to be free of unwarranted regula-
tion of private morality, these courts find regulation of private 
activity for reasons of public morality inappropriate for at least 
two reasons. First, what one does in private, by definition, gener-
ally will not come before the public eye; therefore, government 
interference does not advance the cause of public morality but 
merely restricts individual conduct and imposes concepts of pri-
vate morality chosen by the government.-'0 Second, even if it is 
possible for the public to ascertain what one does in private, in-
fringement of constitutionally protected rights cannot be justi-
fied by general community disapproval of the protected conduct, 
because constitutional protection of individual liberties inten-
tionally prevents majoritarian coercion.41 
37. While some claim that natural rights analysis has become simply a "historical 
curiosity," L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-3, at 894, discussion of natural rights do arise in 
opinions of several Justices. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J. concur-
ring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-42 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United Mine 
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947). Furthermore, if the Framers did not in-
tend the ninth amendment to be a meaningless tautology, see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect."), it must serve as the guard-
ian of otherwise unmentioned constitutional rights. Therefore, it becomes necessary to 
determine whether the Framer's included the right of sexual privacy as one so obvious as 
to require no elaboration. See supra note 34. 
38. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). This power has been justified on 
the grounds that the destruction of morality renders the power of government invalid, 
since government is, in essence, no more than public order. Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. 
v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 4 N.Y.2d 349, 359, 151 N.E.2d 197, 205, 175 
N.Y.S.2d 39, 47, rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 684 (1958). 
39. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 491-92, 415 N.E.2d 936, 943, 434 
N.Y.S.2d 947, 953 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (finding state statute prohib-
iting private acts of consensual sodomy among unmarried adults violated defendant's 
right of privacy and could not be justified as a valid exercise of police power authorized 
for the preservation of morality, since "[n]o substantial prospect of harm from consen-
sual sodomy nor any threat to public-as opposed to private-morality has been 
shown"). 
40. Id. at 489-90; State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 218-20, 381 A.2d 333 (1977). 
41. Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (W.D. Mich. 
1983); see also People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 490, 415 N.E.2d 936, 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d 
947, 952 (1980) ("disapproval by a majority of the populace ... may not substitute for 
the required demonstration of a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area ... 
protected [by the constitutional] right of privacy"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); 
accord Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971). 
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Note the circular quality of this reasoning: an activity is con-
stitutionally protected because it is done in private and conse-
quently does not affect public morality; therefore, even if the ac-
tivity is somehow disclosed to the public, it is still protected 
against majoritarian coercion by the right of privacy, though it 
may now have an effect on public morality. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seemingly adopted at least 
a limited version of the public/private morality distinction in 
Stanley v. Georgia.42 The Court held that, although obscenity is 
not protected by the first amendment, the mere private posses-
sion of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a 
crime.43 While some have read this decision as protecting only 
the right to receive information and ideas,44 the Court later ex-
pressly denied this view and reaffirmed its belief in the constitu-
tional protection of the privacy of the home. 45 
Yet Stanley does not stand for the proposition, as some would 
argue, that the right of privacy includes a ban on criminal sanc-
tions against any voluntary act done in private which does not 
harm others.46 In addition to its interest in preventing an indi-
vidual from harming others, a government also has an interest in 
protecting both society at large47 and, to a certain extent, the 
individual himself.48 Therefore, just as the government may reg-
ulate the private use of drugs to prevent physical and mental 
42. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
43. Id. at 559-62. 
44. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 501 n.2, 415 N.E.2d 936, 948 n.2, 434 
N.Y.S.2d 947, 958-59 n.2 (1980) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 
(1981); Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 374-75, 430 A.2d 570, 575 (1981). This view is 
supported by the Stanley opinion: 
What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State . . . to make 
possession of other items . . . a crime. Our holding in the present case turns 
upon the Georgia statute's infringement of fundamental liberties protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved 
in most statutes making mere possession criminal. 
394 U.S. at 568 n.11. 
45. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (If there is a first amend-
ment "penumbra" protecting otherwise unprotected obscene material, it would not have 
been necessary to decide Stanley on the "basis of the 'privacy of the home' which was 
hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.' ") (quoting Stanley, 
394 U.S. at 564). 
46. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 759 (2d ed. 1983) 
("Such a right would be based on the philosophy which underlies ... any true right to 
privacy; that society may not limit individual freedom unless it does so to prevent an 
individual from harming others."). 
47. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 57-58 ("[L)egitimate state interests 
. . . include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total community 
environment .... "). 
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-12. 
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damage to the individual,49 it should also be allowed to regulate 
private sexual relations to the extent such regulation addresses 
the social problems of illegitimacy and venereal disease and at-
tempts to prevent potential destructive effects on the familial 
structure. 
Stanley affords only limited protection of sexual privacy. The 
decision merely defends acts performed in the privacy of the 
home against government regulations that are based strictly on 
morality grounds. Yet most regulations of sexual behavior are 
based at least in part on public welfare grounds, and Stanley 
clearly does not elevate to fundamental right status the ability 
to do in private an activity that could otherwise be regulated by 
the state. 110 
In short, to the extent that men create governments to regu-
late, there can be no natural fundamental right to go unregu-
lated, 111 and in the absence of such a natural right, the ninth 
amendment will not adequately protect against state intrusion 
into the private sexual activities of police officers. 
2. Right of privacy in activities associated with the family-
Private protection for certain aspects of the family relationship 
constitutes a more likely candidate for natural right status. For 
example, the Supreme Court quite clearly afforded strict protec-
tion to the marital privacy.112 The Court has implied that this 
protection does not arise out of any explicit constitutional guar-
antee, but rather is one of the natural rights of man. 113 Even 
strong advocates of the view that the ninth amendment funda-
mentally protects constitutionally unmentioned natural rights 
are quick to concede that such protection doe$ not extend to 
sexual conduct in and of itself.Ci" Rather, the ninth amendment 
49. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). But see Ravin v. State, 537 
P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (holding that individuals have a right under both the federal and 
Alaska constitutions to possess marijuana for private, noncommercial use in one's home, 
since such use does not seriously interfere with the health, safety, rights, and privileges 
of others or with the public welfare). 
50. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 ("What we have said in no way infringes upon 
the power of the State or federal government to make possession of other items, such as 
narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime."). 
51. See, e.g., id.; accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("The Court has re-
fused to recognize an unlimited right" of the individual to do with her body as she 
pleases.). 
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("The very idea [of intrusion 
into the precincts of the marital bedroom] is repulsive to notions of privacy surrounding 
the marriage relationship."). 
53. Id. at 486 ("We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights .... 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate 
to the degree of being sacred."). 
54. See, e.g., id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (it is constitutionally permissible to 
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protects the fundamental right of privacy in the marital relation, 
"a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire 
civilization. "55 
The Supreme Court has strengthened this argument for natu-
ral right protection of activities associated with the family by 
extending the guarantee of personal privacy to marriage itself,56 
procreation,57 contraception,58 family relationships,59 child rear-
ing and education,60 and abortion.61 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has come extremely close to acknowledging a natural right of 
family privacy, rooted in the nation's history and tradition.62 
Hence, while there may be no general right to be free from gov-
ernmental regulation,63 the ninth amendment does encompass 
the right of family privacy and strict scrutiny should therefore 
be applied to all governmental regulation of "family" activities. 
In sum, although many of the courts which invalidate state 
regulation of police officers' off-duty, sexual activity do so on the 
basis of a due process violation of the individual's right of pri-
vacy, the protection that may validly be offered is slim. Under 
either a penumbra! or natural right theory, no all-encompassing 
fundamental right of privacy exists, and due process, therefore, 
cannot afford privacy any protection other than in the realm of 
the family relationship. This does not mean, however, that the 
state is free to regulate all activity of the off-duty police officer 
short of intrusion into a family relationship for, as Part II of this 
Note explains, prohibiting a police officer from engaging in off-
duty conduct in which the general public may engage violates 
the equal protection clause. 
prohibit adultery and fornication); id. at 498-99 (a state may properly regulate sexual 
promiscuity and misconduct). 
55. Id. at 495-96, 499. 
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967)). 
57. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942)). 
58. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)). 
59. Id. at 153 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
60. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
61. Id. at 154. 
62. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) ("[T)he liberty 
interest in family privacy has its source, . . . not in state law, but in intrinsic human 
rights, as they have been understood in 'this Nation's history and tradition.'") (citation 
omitted); see also supra note 53. 
63. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51. 
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II. AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF SEXUAL PRIVACY 
Like the protection afforded by due process,6" that arising out 
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause has tra-
ditionally been effectuated by means of a two-tier test. In gen-
eral, a court will uphold a challenged law that it finds to be rea-
sonably related to a legitimate government concern. 66 When, 
however, the challanged law intrudes upon a fundamental right, 
it faces heightened scrutiny and will be invalidated "unless 
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental 
interest. "66 
Both courts67 and commentators68 have expressed severe dis-
satisfaction with the rigid two-tier format of equal protection 
analysis. Under this format, initial determination of the stan-
dard to be applied effectively determines the final outcome. 69 
Growing dissatisfaction with the two-tier format has not led the 
Supreme Court to abandon use of either the strict scrutiny or 
rational basis test. The Court has, however, shown a willingness 
to expand the contours of the equal protection clause by adding, 
in certain circumstances, a more flexible balancing test which re-
64. See supra note 11. 
65. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); see also L. TRIBE supra 
note 15, §§ 16-2 to -5. 
Reflecting the broad deference afforded legislatures by the courts, most laws chal-
lenged under this test are upheld. See L. TRIBE supra note 15, § 16-2. This is especially 
evident from the Court's rejection of equal protection challenges to economic and social 
legislation. See, e.g., Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213 (1978) (per 
curiam); Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977) (per curiam); Fergu-
son v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Consequently, the rational basis test requires only 
"minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court, 
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Euoluing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
66. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 15, 
§§ 16-6 to -18. Strict scrutiny is also required in cases involving suspect classifications, 
see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); however, the suspect class aspect of 
equal protection is not relevant to the present discussion. Commentators have described 
strict scrutiny as "scrutiny that [is] 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra 
note 65, at 8. 
67. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 
188-89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 & n.* 
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
68. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-30, at 1089: 
[T]he all-or-nothing choice between minimum rationality and strict scrutiny ill-
suits the broad range of situations arising under the equal protection clause, 
many of which are best dealt with neither through the virtual rubber-stamp of 
truly minimal review nor through the virtual death blow of truly strict scrutiny, 
but through methods more sensitive to risks of injustice than the former and yet 
less blind to the needs of governmental flexibility than the latter. 
69. See supra notes 65-66. 
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quires closer scrutiny of the competing interests involved in the 
particular case.70 The Court applies this intermediate level of re-
view to cases involving differential treatment of sensitive (as op-
posed to "suspect") classes and important (as opposed to "fun-
damental") individual interests, or to cases indirectly affecting 
constitutionally preferred interests.71 
The right of sexual privacy is arguably an important, if not 
fundamental, individual interest; therefore, any law· which in-
fringes on this interest should be subject to the middle-tier ap-
proach. 72 Indeed, the Supreme Court used this intermediate 
level of analysis in Eisenstadt v. Baird73 to invalidate a prohibi-
tion on contraception as violating the rights of single persons 
under the equal protection clause.74 Reading Eisenstadt with a 
reasonable interpretation of Griswold75 shows the Court's use of 
an interesting chain of reasoning: even if the state could other-
wise ban contraception on morality grounds, it may not prohibit 
distribution of contraceptives to married persons, as this would 
violate the marital privacy. However, since any moral evil caused 
by use of contraceptives would be identical whether such use 
was by married or unmarried couples, a ban on distribution of 
contraceptives to single, but not married, couples impermissibly 
violates the equal protection clause. Therefore, the state may 
not ban distribution of contraceptives on morality grounds at 
70. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972); Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971). See also L. 
TRIBE, supra note 15, §§ 16-30 to -31. 
71. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-31. 
72. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-20. "[W]hatever the threshold of harm the state 
must otherwise establish to justify intruding upon an aspect of personhood in the public 
realm, the required threshold is significantly higher when the conduct occurs in a place, 
or under circumstances, that the individuals involved justifiably regard as private." Id. at 
985. In fact, the Supreme Court has come close to recognizing a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from un-
warranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."). But see supra note 32; see also L. TRIBE, 
supra note 15, § 15-13, at 944 n.12. 
73. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
74. Although the majority opinion purports to apply the rational basis standard, see, 
e.g., 405 U.S. at 447 & n.7, the scrutiny actually exercised is more intense than that 
which is articulated. See Gunther, supra note 65, at 34-36. This point is reinforced by 
the fact that the Court in Eisenstadt draws its version of the equal protection test from 
a passage it quotes from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). Although in Reed the 
Court also purported to apply the rational basis test, it has subsequently indicated that 
in Reed it actually applied what has become known as the "middle-tier" test. See Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Gunther, supra note 65, at 34. Hence, it is 
this middle-tier test that the Court in Eisenstadt actually used. 405 U.S. at 446-47. 
75. See supra notes 16-32 and accompanying text. 
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all.76 
The Court in Eisenstadt went on to make it clear that even if 
the state could prohibit distribution of contraceptives to married 
persons but chose not to, it could not outlaw distribution to un-
married persons. The evil, as perceived by the state, would in 
each case be identical; therefore, the underinclusion77 would be 
invidious. 78 By this analysis, the Court expresses a desire to per-
form more than cursory equal protection analysis when the right 
of privacy is involved;79 although not utilizing a full strict scru-
tiny test, the Court is unwilling merely to defer to legislative 
judgment. 
This intermediate scrutiny test should be applied to regula-
tions of police officers' off-duty, private sexual conduct. Under 
this test, for a law or regulation to withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, it first must serve an important governmental objective (a 
higher standard than the legitimate purpose required by the ra-
tional basis test); and, second, it must be substantially (as op-
posed to reasonably) related to achievement of that objective.80 
The following sections examine the most likely asserted justifica-
tions for regulating the private activities of police officers and 
conclude that regulation of an officer's off-duty activities cannot 
substantially serve any important governmental objectives. 
A. State Interest in Regulating Off-duty Activity to Promote 
the Public Morality. 
A state may assert many possible justifications for regulating 
the off-duty activities of a police officer. However, assuming that 
promoting the public morality is an important governmental ob-
jective, 81 prohibiting only police officers from engaging in an ac-
76. 405 U.S. at 453. 
77. The equal protection clause guarantees that individuals in similar situations with 
regard to the ends of particular legislation will be dealt with in a similar manner. An 
underinclusive classification violates this concept of horizontal equity because it includes 
some of the people who fit the purpose of the legislation but excludes many others who 
are similarly situated. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 46, at 586-89. 
78; 405 U.S. at 454. Even under the lenient, rational basis standard, underinclusive-
ness will generally serve to invalidate a legislative or administrative mandate. Underin-
clusive classifications, which do not include all those who are similarly situated with re-
spect to the purpose of a law, "burden less than would be logical to achieve the intended 
government end." L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-4, at 997; see also Tussman & tenBroek, 
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 348-51 (1949). 
79. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
80. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
81. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
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tivity solely to protect the public morality would be invidious 
classification, since the evil, as perceived by the state, would be 
identical whether the activity were engaged in by a public em-
ployee or an ordinary citizen.82 Such underinclusion would be a 
violation of equal protection.83 
Nor does the state interest in maintaining a police department 
of individuals with the highest possible moral standards satisfy 
equal protection requirements. Moral requisites are never easily 
defined-if only because of the question of whose moral stan-
dards should be used. Even if a majority view could be ascer-
tained, it would hardly be entitled to much force. 84 Hence, al-
though the state has an important interest in prohibiting the 
unlawful off-duty conduct of police officers,85 an activity that so-
ciety has not deemed sufficiently immoral to be illegal does not 
constitute an activity sufficiently immoral to override a police 
officer's right to privacy.86 
82. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Court 
addressed a legislative division of married and unmarried persons, declaring a state pro-
hibition on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons impermissible. The 
Court reasoned that, because the evil inherent in the use of contraceptives would be 
identical whether such use was by married or unmarried persons, the underinclusion re-
sulting from this moral bifurcation would be invidious. 
83. See supra notes 77-78. While the Court may allow an underinclusive classification 
for problems too large, pragmatically, to be remedied all at once, see, e.g., Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a 
State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the 
problem at all.") (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970)); L. TRIBE, 
supra note 15, § 16-4, at 997 ("In defense of underinclusiveness it has been· argued that 
piecemeal legislation is a pragmatic means of effecting needed reforms, where a demand 
for completeness may lead to total paralysis .... ") (citation ommitted); Tussman & 
tenBroek, supra, at 349, no compelling reason exists for society to target its battle 
against immorality only at police officers. For example, if society deems pre-marital sex 
immoral, and if pre-marital sex is not protected by some right of privacy, it would not be 
impractical to outlaw all pre-marital sex, rather than merely the pre-marital sex of police 
officers. 
84. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Many courts are quick to point out 
that the states must "tread lightly" when regulating the private actions of their employ-
ees and "must be careful not to transform anachronistic notions of unacceptable social 
conduct into law." Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 325, 414 A.2d 82, 90 (1980). 
85. The equal protection clause provides no barrier to prohibiting police officers from 
doing what the population as a whole may not do. Indeed, subjecting police officers to 
additional prohibitions of otherwise illegal conduct is not constitutionally impermissible. 
Police officers are charged with upholding the the law. Consequently, a police officer 
committing a crime places himself in a position where his interests as an individual and 
his interests as an officer will conflict, thereby creating a substantial state interest in 
treating police officers different from the general public. Andrad v. City of Phoenix, 692 
F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1982). 
86. Cf. Risner v. State Personnel Bd. of Review, 56 Ohio App. 2d 21, 27, 381 N.E.2d 
346, 350 (1978) (finding that regulation providing for removal of public employees for 
"immoral conduct" established no higher standards than those prevalent among the gen-
eral public). 
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Furthermore, even if promotion of morality constitutes an im-
portant governmental objective and a valid reason exists for 
treating police officers differently from the general public, to the 
extent that a "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard prohib-
its a certain activity, neither the public's (nor even the legisla-
ture's) view of morality is imposed, but rather the view of the 
officer's superiors. Consequently the standards imposed on po-
lice officers will often be quite different from public standards, 
and will therefore not be substantially, or even reasonably, re-
lated to the important governmental objective. 
B. .State Interest in Promoting a High Degree of Respect for 
Police Officers 
The Supreme Court has made clear that when a state acts as 
an employer it may not, without substantial justification, condi-
tion employment on the relinquishment of constitutional 
rights,87 and further, that even police officers are entitled to full 
protection of these rights. 88 The Court, however, also has indi-
cated that a state may have a greater interest in regulating the 
activities of its employees than the activities of the population 
at large.89 
87. Pickering v. Board of Educ. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Indeed, "[i]t is well estab-
lished that terminable-at-will government employees, while they may generally be dis-
charged for any number of reasons or for no reason at all, may not be discharged for 
exercising their constitutional rights." McMullan v. Carson, 568 F. Supp. 937, 943 (M.D. 
Fla. 1983) (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980)). 
88. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) ("policemen ... are not relegated 
to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.") 
89. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (holding that regulation establishing 
hair grooming standards for police officers does not violate the fourteenth amendment, 
because the choice reflected in the regulation that similarity in appearance is desira-
ble-whether based on a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the public 
or on a desire [or the esprit de corps which such similarity may inculcate-is rationally 
justified). 
Neither of the proposed justifications in Kelley applies to intrusion upon the private 
sexual conduct of police officers. First, nothing a police officer does in private will affect 
the public's ability to recognize him or her on duty. Second, the esprit de corps the Court 
discussed in Kelley arose from a similarity of appearance while on-duty, not from a simi-
larity of life-style choices. For example, the Court would likely not uphold a regulation 
requiring dismissal of all unmarried officers in order to promote an esprit de corps. Fur-
thermore, it is impermissible to attempt to enforce the department's majority morality 
upon individual officers. See supra notes 41, 84 and accompanying text. 
Finally, to the extent that the Court in Kelley recognized the State's interest in con-
ducting its internal affairs, 425 U.S. at 247, regulation of officer appearance (i.e. hair 
grooming) for on-duty police officers constitutes a proper area for state intervention, 
while regulation of off-duty sexual conduct does not. 
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Several lower courts assert an overriding state interest in pro-
moting a high degree of respect for police officers in order to 
facilitate the officers' ability to perform their function.90 Often 
courts worry about a weakening of public confidence and trust.91 
However, promoting a high degree of respect for police officers is 
not a sufficiently important governmental objective to support 
intrusion into the police officer's off-duty, private activities. Al-
though cases upholding the disciplining of police officers may as-
sert to be premised on a loss of community respect for the of-
ficer, the underlying rationale is actually based on this lack of 
respect coupled with some form of immoral behavior.92 It is hard 
to believe that a court would uphold dismissal of an officer in a 
case where lack of respect was not based on some form of "im-
morality."93 Yet imposition of a majority view of moral conduct 
is an impermissible reason to impinge on the police officer's abil-
ity to engage in otherwise lawful off-duty conduct.94 
Furthermore, to justify state regulation, a substantial connec-
tion would have to exist between the police officer's off-duty 
conduct and a weakening of the public confidence. Because what 
one does in private, by definition, generally will not come before 
the public eye, government interference serves no justifiable 
purpose but merely imposes a concept of private morality cho-
sen by the state. 911 Indeed, if factors exist which contribute to 
the belief that sexual activity is a vital component of protected 
personhood, then, to the extent such factors do not depend on 
90. See Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 22 Pa. Commw. 123, 127, 347 A.2d 765, 
768 (1975) (holding that adultery, committed by a police officer while he was off-duty 
constituted "immorality" and "conduct unbecoming an officer" and warranted dismissal 
even though adultery was not a criminal act in the state of Pennsylvania). 
91. Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 22 Pa. Commw. 123, 127, 347 A.2d 765, 768-
69 (1975) (quoting Cerceo v. Darby, 3 Pa. Commw. 174, 183, 281 A.2d 251, 255 (1971)); 
McMullen v. Carson, 568 F. Supp. 937,944 (M.D. Fla. 1983) ("[P]olice departments have 
an important governmental interest in maintaining public confidence in the police force 
and public respect for its officers.") (citation omitted). 
92. For example, in upholding the dismissal of a police officer for adultery (behavior 
which was otherwise legal in the state), the court in Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
22 Pa. Commw. 123, 347 A.2d 765 (1975), relied in large part on the fact that "a great 
portion of our citizenry still believes [adultery) to be morally offensive." Id. at 127, 347 
A.2d at 769. 
93. For example, one can imagine a conservative small community that would not be 
favorably disposed to its male police chief taking ballet lessons. Yet it is hard to believe 
that a court would allow disciplining of the officer based on a loss of respect or confi-
dence resulting from his engaging in this activity. 
94. See supra notes 41, 84 and accompanying text. 
95. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,490,415 N.E.2d 936,941,434 N.Y.S.2d 947,952 
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); accord State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 218-20, 
381 A.2d 333, 341-43 (1977). 
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some narrow definition of privacy,96 failure to seal sexual activ-
ity hermetically from public view provides no basis for state in-
trusion into the private sex lives of police officers.97 This is true 
"[e]ven when the harm feared has existence independent of the 
beholder's awareness of the offending conduct,"98 as may be the 
case when the state is concerned with public opinion of its police 
officers. If a public finding of certain off-duty sexual conduct as 
offensive to contemplate is enough to justify regulatory prohibi-
tion of such conduct then no aspect of the individual's privacy is 
safe from regulation and the notion of protected personhood is 
nothing more than a hollow shell. 99 
Finally, because public expectations influence public confi-
dence, an intrusion upon a police officer's private, off-duty activ-
ities in order to promote public confidence raises a serious policy 
concern. In today's society, some police officers will engage in 
off-duty sexual conduct even in the face of prohibiting regula-
tions. 100 Public confidence in the police department will be more 
shaken if police officers engage in such conduct in violation of 
regulations than if no such regulations exist. Both the public at 
large and police officers themselves will acquire a general disre-
spect for regulations which prohibit what might otherwise be 
pervasive conduct. 101 To the extent that this occurs, any regula-
tion of otherwise lawful, off-duty activity promulgated to pro-
mote public trust in the police department will be self-defeating. 
C. State Interest in Ensuring the Proper Functioning of the 
Police Department 
Some courts assert that, to justify controlling the private, off-
duty conduct of a police officer, a governing body must show 
that his or her "usefulness as a police officer would be substan-
96. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-13, at 947-48. For example, the doctor's involve-
ment in Griswold in the couple's decision on contraception did not cause them to forfeit 
their constitutional protection. Id. 
97. Accord Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 
(1962) (finding that the right of privacy required dismissal of charge in consensual act 
between two men seen through a hole in the ceiling of a store toilet stall). 
98. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-20, at 984. 
99. Cf. id., § 15-19, at 981 ("If simply finding another's appearance or habits offensive 
to hear, see, or think about were enough to justify exclusionary regulation, rights of per-
sonhood ... would be at an end."). 
100. Cf. Kadish, The Crisis of Ouercriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 159-60 (1967). 
101. Id. at 160 ("Moral adjudications vulnerable to a charge of hypocrisy are self-
defeating no less in Jaw than elsewhere."). 
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tially and materially impaired by the conduct in question."102 
This view has the advantage of both an important governmental 
objective (to promote order and safety through a well-
functioning police department), and a substantial connection be-
tween the classification and the purpose of the statute.103 How-
ever, this connection loses any semblance of reasonableness un-
less the regulation requires disciplining a police officer only for 
private, off-duty, sexual conduct that has an actual-rather than 
possible-substantial effect on the officer's inherent ability to 
perform. 10" Otherwise the regulation contains no effective limit 
on the aspects of the police officer's private life that may be reg-
ulated by the state-all off-duty activity has some possible effect 
on on-duty performance. 
Recognition of the need for a direct connection between the 
102. Smith v. Price, 446 F. Supp. 828, 834 (W.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 
616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980); accord Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 
459 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
103. It may be useful to compare the line of teacher dismissal cases, in which the 
courts are called upon to determine whether a teacher's sexual conduct constitutes suffi-
cient grounds for dismissal or suspension under a statute prohibiting "immoral conduct." 
While some courts have held that a teacher's inability to obey the law or otherwise act 
in accordance with traditional moral principles may alone be grounds for dismissal, Pet-
tit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 36, 513 P.2d 889, 894, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 
(1973), many others declare that dismissal may not be based on unfitness absent proof 
that retention "poses a significant danger of harm to either students, school employees, 
or others who might be affected by [one's) actions as a teacher." Morrison v. State Bd. 
of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 235, 461 P.2d 375, 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 191 (1969) (emphasis 
added). In other words, a teacher's private sexual conduct becomes a proper concern only 
to the extent that it directly and negatively affects his or her abilities as a teacher. 
Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 291, 
233 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1967). Where the teacher's abilities are unaffected and the school 
faces no danger, the teacher's private sexual activities are his or her own business and 
should not be the basis of dismissal or suspension. Id.; Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 
Ill. App. 3d 481, 485, 311 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1974) (holding that dismissal is proper "only 
where the record shows harm to pupils, faculty, or the school itself'), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 61 Ill. 2d 101, 329 N.E.2d 218 (1975); see also Jerry v. Board 
of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 534,324 N.E.2d 106, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1974) (holding that teacher's 
private association with a member of the opposite sex is not by itself a concern of the 
school unless the school board demonstrates that such association may interfere with the 
teacher's responsibilites to students and ability to teach); accord Sullivan v. Meade ln-
dep. School Dist., 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976). 
104. More and more courts are apparently recognizing this fact. See L. TRIBE supra 
note 15, § 15-13, at 942 n.3 ("The courts have increasingly put public agencies to the test 
of proving a tangible and non-trivial connection between alleged 'immorality' and the 
employee's ineffectiveness in performing his or her duties.") (emphasis added); see also 
Perea v. Fales, 39 Cal. App. 3d 939, 942, 114 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1974) (A "nexus be-
tween conduct characterized as 'unbecoming an officer' and fitness to perform the func-
tions of a police officer is required for the suspension of an officer from duty.") (citation 
omitted); accord Boussom v. City of Elkhart, 567 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (N.D. Ind. 1983) 
(A police oficer cannot "be removed if the cause for dismissal bears no reasonable rela-
tion to [his] fitness or capacity to ,hold his position.") (citation omitted). 
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off-duty activity and the deterioration in performance eliminates 
the need to examine the underlying off-duty activity. The state 
tries to prevent the evil of poor performance; but poor perform-
ance can, and indeed should, be prohibited, regardless of its 
cause. Punishing poor performance when it results from certain 
activities but not when it results from others creates an invidi-
ous classification and the underinclusion violates the equal pro-
tection clause. 1011 
In sum, state intrusion into the private, off-duty sexual con-
duct of police officers serves no important governmental objec-
tive. Consequently, intruding regulations cannot clear the equal 
protection hurdles necessary to constitute a valid exercise of the 
state's power. The fourteenth amendment's equal protection 
clause thus protects police officers' otherwise legal, private, off-
duty, consensual, sexual conduct from state intrusion. 
III. VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND THE CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN 
OFFICER STANDARD 
Even if the state has some justifiable interest in regulating the 
private, off-duty, sexual activities of police officers, the question 
remains whether a statute or regulation using a "conduct un-
becoming an officer" or similar standard is drawn sufficiently 
narrowly to meet the notice requirement of the due process 
clause. 106 The vagueness doctrine compels the legislature to pro-
mulgate clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers 
of fact, to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of 
statutes and regulations, 107 and to provide fair warning of pro-
105. See supra notes 77-78; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 15-13, at 942 n.3 
("[T]he particular attention courts have given to employment decisions based on private 
sexual conduct arguably evidences a perception that such a factor is not merely extrane-
ous but is invidious.") 
106. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925), quoted in Bence v. 
Breier, 501 F.2d 1188, 1187 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121 (1974) ("[A] 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application 
violates the first essential of due process of law."). 
107. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 556, 572-73 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTI, CRIMINAL LAW, 87-88 (1972); see also 
Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 104 S. Ct. 404 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), denying cert. 
sub nom. to Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1983): 
By demanding that government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of 
clarity, the Due Process Clause ensures that state power will be exercised only 
on behalf of policies reflecting a conscious choice among competing social values; 
reduces the danger of caprice and discrimination in the administration of the 
laws; and permits meaningful judical review of state actions. 
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scribed conduct.108 
Although some courts allow a finding of misconduct to be 
based solely upon the violation of implicit standards of good be-
havior imposed upon those who stand in the public eye as up-
holders of that which is morally and legally correct, 109 most 
courts upholding prohibitions of "conduct unbecoming an of-
ficer" are not as permissive of such a broad standard and admit 
that it may indeed appear vague on its face. no These courts as-
sert that this standard nevertheless withstands constitutional 
challenge because it has been narrowed by custom, usage, and 
judicial interpretation so that it gives a person of ordinary intel-
ligence fair notice that it forbids his contemplated conduct. m 
104 S. Ct. at 407. 
108. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (acknowledging the im-
portance of fair warning, the Court said that when a man remains free to choose between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, the law must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."); W. 
LAFAVE & A. Sco'M', supra note 107, at 85-87. But see Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Federal Courts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 857 n.14 (1974) ("To the extent that it can be 
shown that few people actually rely on the state of the law at the time they act, the fair 
warning rationale is undercut."). 
109. See Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Livingston, 22 Ariz. App. 183, 525 P.2d 949, 953-54 
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 951 (1975). 
110. Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 315-16, 414 A.2d 82, 85-86 (1980); 
Perea v. Fales, 39 Cal. App. 3d 939, 942, 114 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1974) ("The expression 
'conduct unbecoming an officer' fails, on its face, to provide a standard."). 
111. Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 309, 315-16, 414 A.2d 82, 85-86 (1980). In 
Fabio, the court relied on three factors in determining that the standard had been suffi-
ciently narrowed over time. First, the phrase "conduct unbecoming an officer" has been 
continuously and successfully used as a military standard since the 18th century. Second, 
the Supreme Court upheld a similar standard (in a military setting) against a challenge 
of vagueness in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Third, the courts of the state had 
ruled upon specific types of behavior which they had deemed to be unbecoming conduct. 
489 Pa. at 315-17, 414 A.2d at 85-86. 
Military precedents have no application in the civilian context, making the first two 
factors of the court's decision irrelevant to regulation of police officers. Bence v. Breier, 
501 F.2d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir. 1974); accord Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 756. Additionally, 
the imprecision of any military-civilian police analogy precludes its use in the determina-
tion of constitutional rights. Muller v. Conslisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970). 
The third factor factor relied on by the Fabio court-previous state court rulings that 
specific types of behavior constituted unbecoming conduct-does little to alleviate the 
vagueness of the prohibition, since the regulation remains vague as to the propriety of 
conduct which has not yet been the subject of litigation. Furthermore, to the extent that 
a "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard tracks the morals of the community over 
time, conduct that was once allowed under the standard may at any time become prohib-
ited and vice versa, indicating that past judicial decisions will provide less than perfect 
guidance. 
It is important to note that the articulated standard need only give notice to those 
potentially subject to consequences under the rule. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 
107, at 85. Hence, "the required certainty may be provided by the common knowledge of 
members of the particular vocation when the regulation does not itself contain specific 
standards; it may be that police officers 'will normally be able to determine what kind of 
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These courts fail to consider several factors which should in-
validate "conduct unbecoming an officer" and similar standards 
even if they have been somewhat narrowed over time. First, such 
a standard "still does not provide the individual with meaning-
ful guidance concerning the required mode of conduct."112 Even 
though ascertainable areas of permissible and nonpermissible 
behavior may exist, under such a vague standard conduct will 
always exist that will not fit easily into either category. 113 Conse-
quently, the standard does not provide an officer sufficient no-
tice of just what conduct is prohibited.11• 
Second, the subjectivity implicit in the language of the rule 
still allows police officials unfettered discretion in enforce-
ment, 116 substantially decreasing the possibility of even-handed 
application. 116 This potential for arbitrary enforcement is abhor-
rent to the due process clause. 117 
conduct indicates unfitness' to work in law enforcement." Perea v. Fales, 39 Cal. App. 3d 
939, 942, 114 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1974) (citation omitted). 
112. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pitlock, 44 Mich. App. 410, 414, 205 N.W.2d 293, 294-5 
(1973); accord Note, supra note 108, ai 865 ("[T]he Supreme Court and lower federal 
courts have voided for failure to afford fair warning generally applicable criminal and 
civil statutes penalizing . . . 'misconduct,' conduct that is 'annoying,' 'reprehensible,' or 
'improper,' 'immoral' or 'demoralizing,' 'offensive,' and 'prejudicial to the best interests' 
of a city.") (footnotes omitted); see also supra note 111. 
113. If there were no gray area there would be no need for a "conduct unbecoming an 
officer" standard-all prohibited behavior would be known and could be specifically pro-
hibited. To be sure, the level of vagueness permitted will be governed in part by the 
extent to which the context creates a necessity for imprecise regulation, Note, supra note 
108, at 860, but the requirement of specificity has been found infeasible only on rare 
occasion. Cf. id. at 863 n.37. Furthermore, while it is inevitable that there will be some 
degree of uncertainty in applying any prohibitory statute or regulation, W. LAFAVE & A. 
ScoTT, supra note 107, at 84-85, the need for the protection afforded by the vagueness 
doctrine increases "where the uncertainty induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the 
exercise of constitutionally protected rights." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 
(1979) (citations omitted). Consequently, to the extent that a "conduct unbecoming an 
officer" or similar regulatory prohibition may infringe upon the individual's constitu-
tional right of privacy (whatever that right might be) or upon his or her right to equal 
protection, the regulation is subject to the strictest standard of permissible vagueness. 
114. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impor-
tance of notice. 
115. Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974). The officer's superiors, after 
all, will decide whether to fire, demote or suspend the officer for engaging in "miscon-
duct" or to do nothing at all. 
116. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes 
of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and 
the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 221 (1967). 
117. Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974). Of course, this does not 
mean that a rule "is void merely because it grants some discretion to those who adminis-
ter" it. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 107, at 88. "Uncertain statutory language has 
been upheld when the subject matter would not allow more exactness and when greater 
specificity in language would interfere with practical administration." Id. (footnotes 
omitted). But regulation of off-duty police conduct is not a context that creates a neces-
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Finally, because a "conduct unbecoming an officer" or similar 
rule contains no standards, the result of administrative and judi-
cial review will be arbitrary, comprising, at best, nothing more 
than a meaningless gesture. us The vagueness doctrine funda-
mentally guards against this possibility. n 9 
In short, because a "conduct unbecoming an officer" standard 
provides no guidance to those it regulates, enables arbitrary en-
forcement by police officials, and does not set appropriate stan-
dards for review, the courts should not uphold this standard. 
Those who assert the need for a broad standard, because of the 
impossibility of regulating specifically against all relevant activi-
ties, and who then assert that the "conduct unbecoming an of-
ficer" rule has been sufficiently narrowed by the courts to pro-
vide fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that the 
regulation forbids contemplated conduct, state conflicting pro-
positions. If an individual can know all forbidden conduct, a reg-
ulation can specifically prohibit such activities. Broad standards 
are, therefore, neither a necessary nor a desirable way to enforce 
proper behavior and should be struck down. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the courts have almost uniformly overlooked 
the equal protection inquiry suggested by this Note. They focus 
exclusively on due process reasoning regardless of outcome. This 
view, perhaps promoted by the Supreme Court's unwillingness 
or inability to make a definitive statement on the bounds of the 
constitutional right of privacy, is entirely backward. The due 
process clause alone affords scant protection to the private sex-
ual activities of police officers. The barrier erected by the equal 
protection clause, however, should no longer be ignored. The 
courts should apply equal protection analysis when confronted 
with problems of regulation of off-duty police conduct. 
Even if the state has an interest in regulating the private, off-
duty sexual activities of its police officers substantial enough to 
clear the equal protection hurdles, any regulation must be drawn 
narrowly enough to meet the notice requirement of the due pro-
cess clause. "Conduct unbecoming an officer" and similar stan-
sity for imprecise standards. See supra note 113, Rather, such regulations embody a 
clear attempt to exercise state power without making a conscious choice among compet-
ing social values and therefore violate the due process clause. See supra note 107. 
118. Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1974). 
119. See supra note 107. 
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<lards do not meet this criterion and are therefore impermissible. 
While society may depend on its police officers to enforce the 
rules which protect both its citizens and its structure, any ten-
dency to view police officers only as public servants and not as a 
part of the society must be resisted. When a police officer is in 
off-duty garb, he or she is entitled to the safeguards and privi-
leges available to any citizen. Indeed, allowing the state to strip 
the rights of an individual who has honorably chosen to serve 
society is allowing it to punish the individual who is most wor-
thy_ of praise. Courts must therefore be especially zealous in ap-
plying equal protection and vagueness doctrines to regulations of 
police officers' off-duty activities. 
-Michael A. Woronoff 
